Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1954

Don Adamson v. United Mine Workers of America
: Supplemental Brief of Defendant and Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Dart & Sheya; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Adamson v. United Mine Workers of America, No. 8161 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2180

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

j
u. \if u.
r-.

·~-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
DON ADAMSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8161

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA,
Defendant and Respondent.

Supplemental
Brief of Defendant and Resp·ondent
DART & SHEYA

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page

ARGUMENT IN ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL
CITATIONS SUBMITTED SINCE ARGUMENT OF
ABOVE CASE .................................................................................... 1
POINT I PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL CITATIONS
ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREIN .................................... 1
STATUTES CITED
29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 141 .................................................................................... 2
Section 301 (e) 61 Stat. 156, 157, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 185 (e) .............. 3
Sec. 6, Norris LaGuardia Act (as cited in Patton case, supra,
p. 747, footnote 2) ................................................................................ 3
Sec. 34-1-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .............................................. 4
INDEX OF CASES
United Mine Workers of America v. Patton, U. S. Circuit Court,
211 Federal 2d, 742 ............................................................................ 1
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, 75 S.E. 2d, 694 (Virginia) .............................................. 2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
DON ADAMSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8161

UNITED M~NE WORKERS OF
AMERICA,

Defendant and Respondent.

Supp·lemental
Brief of Defendant and Respondent
ARGUMENT IN ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
ADDITIONAL CITATIONS SUBMITTED SINCE
ARGUMENT OF ABOVE CASE
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL CITATIONS ARE
NOT APPLICABLE HEREIN
Comes now the abov·e named defendant, and after obtaining permission from the Honorable Chief Justice of this
Court, files its Supplemental Brief answering the additional
citations submitted by the plaintiff since this case was
argued before this Court on September 20, 1954, to-wit:
United Mine Workers of America v. Patton, U. S. Circuit
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Court, 211 Federal 2d, 742, and United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, 75 S. E. 2d, 694
(Virginia).
The plaintiffs in the Patton case brought action to
recover damages under the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 141, ·et seq. Plaintiffs were partners
conducting coal mining operations in western Virginia. Defendants were the United Mine Workers of America, International Union, and District 28 of said organization.
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants by a strike at the mines
of the Clinchfield Coal Corporation caused that corporation
to cease doing business with plaintiffs, resulting in destruction of plaintiffs' business.
First of all, in the Patton case there was evidenc·e that
the strikes in question were called by the Field Representative of the United Mine Workers (International), who
was employed by District 28, and that he was engaged in
the organization work that was being carried on by International through District 28, a division of International.
The Court said on Page 746 :

''It is clear that in carrying on organizational work
the field representative is engaged in the business
of both the international union and the district and
that both are responsible for acts done by him
within the scope and course of his employment
(citing cases)."
On the other hand, there is no evidence in the Adamson
case, which is before this Court, that any strike was called
by a field representative of International, or that International was engaged in any organizational work through
District 22 at the time of the alleged grievances. The evi-
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3
dence is to the effect that the work stoppage, or strike, in
the Adamson case was called and conducted by the individual employees of the Coal Creek Goal Company and
Eastern Utah Coal Company, its successor, and that neither
the District nor International actually participated therein.
Another important difference between the Patton case
and the case at bar is that in the former, the Court held that
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not adopted by
the Labor Management Relations Act, and that its application to suits under that act was expressly ·excluded by Section 301 (e) 61 Stat. 156, 157, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 185 (e) which
provides:
"For the purposes of this section, in determining
whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of
another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
The Court then points out that the history of the Labor
Management R·elations Act shows clearly that the intent of
Congress was to apply to suits of this character the common
law rules with respect to liability for the acts of an agent.
Therefore, the Patton case was decided under the Labor
Management Relations Act which expressly excluded Sec. 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which the Court in the Patton
case quotes on p. 747, footnote 2, as follows:
"No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be
held responsible or liable in any court of the
United States for the unlawful acts of individual
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officers, members, or agents, except upon clear
proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof."
We call attention to the similarity of language contained in said Sec. 6 and that of Sec. 34-1-26, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, fully set forth on p. 23 of Defendant's hrief
herein, which said statute applies to the Adamson case and
is still in full force and effect. Our Utah statute requires
that before the defendant can be held liable for the unlawful acts of its officers, members, or agents, there must be
proof by the weight of the evidence and without the aid of
any presumptions of law or fact, both of the doing of such
acts by such officers, members, or agents, and actual participation in, or actual authorization thereof, or ratification
after actual knowledge thereof by said association or organization. Since these requir·ements wer·e not necessary in
the Patton case, and were expr·essly excluded therefrom, it
being decided under the common law rules of agency, and
provisions of Federal Law not applicable herein, the two
cases ar-e definitely distinguishable, and the Patton case is
not in point.
The second new case cited by plaintiff, to-wit: United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,
supra, was a tort action against United Construction Workers, United Mine Workers of Am·erica, and District 50,
United Mine Workers of America. There was evidence in
said case that defendants' agents came to the place where
plaintiff was doing certain construction work and demanded
that 'plaintiff's employees becom·e members of the United
Construction Workers; that plaintiff r·ecognize that organization as sole bargaining agent for its employees on said
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projects; that if plaintiff and its employees refus·ed to comply, it would not be allowed to continue said work. Plaintiff
and its employees refused to comply, and a series of violent
and unlawful acts by defendants' agents ensued, resulting in
the abandonment of the projects.
The United Construction Workers, affiliated with the
United Mine Worlmrs of America, is governed by an administrativ'e officer, who has general and complete supervision
over the administration of its affairs. The administrative
officer is authorized to appoint regional directors, ·charged
with the duty of supervising organizing activities within
their regions, among other things. The administrative offic-er also appoints field representatives, who work under
the direction of the regional directors while engaged in
organizing activities, and other duties.
District 50, United Mine Workers of America is likewise gov,erned by an administrative officer with the same
powers of general and ·complete supervision and administration of the affairs of the district. He also appoints regional
directors and field representativ·es to work under them
while engaged in organizing activities. Regional directors
have the duty of supervising organizing activities within
their regions, among other things. We have been reliably
informed that both the United Construction Workers and
said District 50 were governed in this. manner during the
period involved in the United Construction Workers' case.
William 0. Hart, the agent involved in said ·case, was a
Field Representative of the United Construction Workers
and said District 50, working under David Hunter, Regional
Director of Region 58 of United Construction Workers and
District 50. As Field Representative, part of his duties was
organizing workers. The torts in said case arose out of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

organ1zmg activities and were ratified by David Hunter,
said Regional Director. Hart's conduct was admittedly
pursuant to the Regional Director's orders. Therefore, the
Regional Director and Field Representative were acting
within the scope of their employment, to-wit: organi·zing
worl~ers, when they committed the torts sued upon. They
were both appointed by the administrative officer in charge
of the affairs of the union to perform such organizational
activities. There is a direct connection, therefore, between
the administrative officer and the regional director and field
representativ,e, and they were acting within the scope of
their employment when the torts were committed.
The court also found that District 50 is at least the
agent of the United Mine Workers of America (International) in organizing workers in businesses other than that
of mining coal. Therefore, International was held liable
along with the other two organizations.
However, in the Adamson case, the evidence does not
show that Harry Mangus, or any of the pickets, were authorized by International to perform any organizational activities whatsoever, or that they were acting for or on behalf
of the def,endant. The evidence is to the ·effect that the
work stoppage and picketing were instituted and maintained
by the employees themselves on their own initiative, and
without any sanction whatsoever from either District 22,
or the defendant, International. The evidence also discloses
that Harry Mangus was a district officer only and was acting from time to time either on his own volition, or at the
request of the officers of the local union to whom the employees belonged. The evidence further shows that the officers of District 22 are either elected or appointed within
the District, not by any administrative officer in Washing-
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ton, D. C. District 22 is autonomous; therefore, the agency
shown in the United Construction Workers' case is lacking
in the Adamson case. Furthermore, there was shown in the
United Construction Workers' cas·e that the regional director and field representative were acting within the course
of their employment, to-wit: the organizing of workers,
when they committed the torts for which suit was brought,
whereas in the Adamson cas,e, it fs not shown that either
Harry Mangus or any of the pickets were engag.ed in any
course of employment of the defendant whatsoever.
We submit, therefore, that said two new cases cited
by plaintiff since the argument of this case are r·eadily
distinguishable from the cas·e at bar, and are not authorities in point on the issue of agency involv·ed in the Adamson case.
Respectfully submitted,
DART & SHEYA

By lsi Edward Sheya
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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